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Abstract 
Myanmar's agricultural economy is in transition from a planned to a market system. However, the 
economy does not seem to capture the full gains of productivity growth expected from such a 
transition. Using a micro dataset collected in 2001 and covering more than 500 households in eight 
villages with diverse agro-ecological environments, this paper shows that policy interventions in 
land use and agricultural marketing underlie the lack of income growth. Regression analyses 
focusing on within-village variations in cropping patterns show that the acreage share under non-
lucrative paddy crops is higher for farmers who are under tighter control of the local administration. 
Keywords: reform, food policy, transitional economies, Asia, Myanmar. 
1 1. Introduction 
The agricultural economy of Myanmar (formerly Burma) has been under transition from a 
planned to a market system since the late 1980s. Historical experience from countries around the 
world shows that such a transition is often associated with a productivity gain in agriculture. 
According to a literature survey by Rozelle and Swinnen (2004), such productivity gains were 
largest in East Asia, where the gain also resulted in higher agricultural output. In contrast, in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, although agricultural productivity improved, output growth was not 
substantial and in fact negative in a number of countries. Rozelle and Swinnen attribute the contrast 
to the fact that in East Asia, economic planning kept agricultural produce prices artificially low, 
while in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, it kept prices artificially high. Within East Asia, 
agricultural performance has been most impressive in China and Vietnam. High growth in 
agricultural output and productivity partly accounted for the rapid reduction in rural poverty in these 
two countries. Although Rozelle and Swinnen do not discuss Myanmar in their text, they include it 
in their table in the group of successful East Asian countries and their numbers show a substantial 
increase in agricultural output in Myanmar (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004: Tables 1 and 2). However, 
due to a lack of data they do not provide any evidence on the productivity/income gain in Myanmar. 
The aim of this paper is to attempt to widen our understanding of the impact of agricultural 
policies in transitional economies through an examination of the case of Myanmar. Even though the 
country was the world's largest exporter of rice in the pre-World War II period and remains one of 
the world's largest producers of rice today, little research on Myanmar's rural economy is available 
and the effects of agricultural policies on production and rural incomes are not well documented. A 
few studies, by the International Rice Research Institute (Garcia et al., 2000) and by Japanese 
economists (Takahashi, 2000; Okamoto, 2004; Fujita and Okamoto, 2000; Fujita, 2003), do exist, 
but compared with the amount of research conducted on other East Asian countries, the case of 
Myanmar remains relatively unexamined. This study tries to partly fill the gap by using a primary 
dataset that is more recent, provides more detailed information, and covers more geographically 
diverse regions than previous studies. 
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 Using the same dataset as used in this paper, Kurosaki et al. (2004) confirmed that 
Myanmar has experienced a rapid increase in agricultural production since its transition to a market 
economy; yet, they also found evidence that the country does not seem to have captured the full 
potential of productivity growth expected from such a transition. Their study highlighted two 
paradoxical situations: first, income levels were higher in villages far from the center than in villages 
located in regions under the tight control of the central authorities; second, farmers and villages that 
emphasized a paddy-based, irrigated cropping system had lower farming incomes than those that did 
not. The authors suggested that Myanmar's transition did not lead to a rapid increase in productivity 
because too much production emphasis was put on paddy crops yielding a lower income per acre 
than other crops and the government had the wherewithal to force farmers to plant paddy. 
To demonstrate that the responsibility for low productivity and low income in Myanmar 
lies with government policy, this paper focuses on the fact that the level of enforcement of 
government crop planning varied not only across villages but also within villages across farmers. 
Concretely, this paper examines the determinants of individual farmers' crop choice by using 
household data. The estimation results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that the share of 
non-lucrative paddy is higher for farmers who are under tighter control of the local authorities. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background and the dataset, 
showing a negative relation between paddy acreage shares and per-acre farm incomes. To explain 
this situation, Section 3 develops a theoretical model of crop choice where political relations 
between farmers and the local administration play a key role. A prediction of the theoretical model to 
be tested empirically is also derived in the section. Section 4 provides the estimation results. 
Simulation results to quantify the impact of policy distortions on household income are also 
presented in this section. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Background and Data
1 
2.1 Myanmar's Economy and Agricultural Policies 
Myanmar, whose population is close to 50 million, is in transition from a planned to a 
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 market economy. The military government that has been in power since 1988 has deregulated 
various economic activities (Cook and Minogue, 1993). Industrial development is under process, 
but currently the agricultural sector still remains dominant in the national economy (Table 1). The 
estimated income level is among the lowest in the world. Rice is the staple food in Myanmar, 
accounting for more than 20% of consumption expenditure of the nation (CSO, 2002). 
The government has given high priority to the expansion of paddy production, because it 
believes that a stable supply of rice is a prerequisite for political stability. To achieve this expansion, 
the government has introduced various reforms in agricultural marketing since the late 1980s. Under 
the regime that was in force until fiscal year 2003/04, the state procured from farmers only a limited 
and fixed amount of paddy and allowed them to sell the surplus freely in private markets. Since 
paddy prices in the market during the late 1980s and early 1990s were usually much higher than the 
government-fixed procurement price, the reform initially gave a substantial incentive to produce a 
surplus. Because of this impact, Okamoto (2005) called these reforms "the first phase of marketing 
liberalization."
2 In addition, the government has been promoting the expansion of paddy areas 
through irrigation investment. Throughout the 1990s, numerous dams were constructed in some 
areas, while private investment in small scale diesel pumps was promoted in others, in order to 
increase paddy cultivation in the dry season. 
As a result of these two measures, both the area under cultivation and paddy production in 
Myanmar rose remarkably in the early 1990s (Garcia et al., 2000; Fujita, 2003). However, as shown 
in Kurosaki et al.'s (2004) detailed analysis, such policies resulted in low incomes for farmers 
because the production of paddy was not profitable due to repressed domestic prices for paddy 
resulting from the government monopoly of rice export. Since the income per acre was lower for 
paddy than for other crops, the government needed to force farmers to plant paddy rather than other 
crops, and it did so through its agricultural policies toward paddy marketing and land use. 
Under the economic reforms adopted by the current government, the system of state 
ownership of land established during the period of General Ne Win's ``Burmese Socialism" 
remained more or less intact, though unofficial transfers of tillage rights were frequent (Takahashi, 
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 2000). Farmers did not have the official right to exchange, transfer, lease, inherit, or mortgage their 
land, though children were usually given the right to cultivate their parents' land. To retain their 
tillage right for paddy fields, farmers were obliged to grow paddy crops and supply a designated 
amount of paddy to the government procurement system. The procurement quota for paddy was set 
as a fixed quantity per acre of land designated as paddy field. In the main paddy-growing areas, the 
quota was approximately 20% of gross produce, while it was lower in other areas. Since the quota 
was set irrespective of the actual acreage devoted to paddy or the actual output of paddy, this may 
seem to be a non-distortionary implicit tax. In reality, however, the system adversely affected paddy 
production in Myanmar because of the incentive effects it created. The first of these was a 
disincentive effect on the quality of rice that was supplied to the state, which was so low that it was 
not accepted in foreign markets. The second effect regards the incentives that influenced farmers' 
crop choice (see next section). Although crop planning by the government was officially abandoned 
in 1987, farmers continued to face the threat of seeing their tillage rights revoked if they deviated too 
much from crop plans agreed with local administrators, especially with respect to paddy. 
Another important characteristic of Myanmar's rural economy is the existence of a large 
pool of landless, non-farm households consisting of families that were not allocated any farmland in 
the land reforms of the 1950s because they did not own means of production such as bullocks. The 
share of landless, non-farm households in villages typically ranges from 20 to 50%. The majority of 
landless households depend on income earned as agricultural wages and their wealth level tends to 
be lower than that of landed households. 
2.2 Characteristics of Sample Villages and Households 
As a result of the country's isolationist foreign policy, the availability of micro data on 
Myanmar's rural economy is limited. We therefore conducted a survey of sample households 
belonging to eight selected villages
3 in June-October 2001 (Kurosaki et al., 2004). 
The characteristics of the villages are shown in Table 2. The first two villages (DELTA1 
and DELTA 2) are located in the delta regions of lower Myanmar and DRY1 is located in the 
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 Mandalay Basin, which is one of Myanmar's centers of commercial crop production due to its long 
history of canal irrigation dating back to Burma's dynastic period. In contrast, DRY2 and DRY3 
represent villages relying on rainfed agriculture. DRY2 is more typical of a dry zone village since 
only rainfed crops and no paddy crops are grown here. HILL1 and HILL2 represent villages relying 
on vegetable-based development in hilly regions. Both villages sell their vegetables to major 
consumption centers such as Yangon and Mandalay, while their paddy cultivation is oriented toward 
subsistence. The last village of the study, COAST, lies in the coastal region of southern Myanmar, 
where tropical agro-forestry (rubber, fruits, cashew nuts, etc.) prevails. Peasant farmers run both 
small-scale rubber estates and paddy farms. Among the eight villages studied, COAST has the most 
active non-farm sector, which includes general shops, cycle taxis, and fish processing. The eight 
villages chosen are thus quite representative of the diverse agro-ecosystems found in Myanmar. 
The specific villages were carefully chosen to ensure that they would be representative of 
each region. As far as can be judged by the statistics on cropping patterns and land distribution, this 
aim was achieved. Sample households were drawn from a complete list of households in each of the 
villages studied. While these households are not strictly a random sample, we used information 
obtained from village leaders and local administrations to eliminate discretionary elements, so that 
the sample households were as representative as possible in terms of the distribution of farmland and 
primary jobs. A total of 521 households were surveyed in the eight villages (Table 3): the 341 
households denoted as "Farm" are households with land tillage rights, while the 180 households 
denoted as "Non-farm" have no tillage rights. 
A structured questionnaire was used for all households to establish household 
characteristics, household assets, income, consumption, and debt and credit. The sample households 
include 2,850 persons, implying that the average household size is 5.5 persons. This part of the 
dataset provides the individual attributes that are used in the analysis of factors that affect crop 
choice. If households operated farmland, they were asked to fill in an additional questionnaire on 
farm management. This part of the dataset provides household-level information on agricultural 
input, output, and disposal/marketing. Household heads or other relevant persons were interviewed 
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 by local research assistants and the information was cross-checked on the spot by the authors to 
ensure internal consistency and data quality. 
2.3 Household Income, Cropping Patterns, and Farm Productivity 
Table 4 reports the asset and income status of the sample households. The average land 
holding size among the sample households was 5.6 acres, which is large by South-East Asian 
standards. Ownership of modern assets, in contrast, compares poorly: no households owned four-
wheel tractors; and though bicycles were common among villagers, motorcycles and four-wheel 
vehicles for transportation were very rare. Livestock were the most common and important assets. 
Overall average incomes were 184,000 Kyats per household and 36,000 Kyats per person 
per year. If these figures are converted at the market exchange rate of 650 Kyats/US$ prevailing 
during the study period, they are equivalent to $283 per household and $55 per person per year. 
Incomes in the sample villages thus were indeed low, but not that different from the average village 
in rural Myanmar. If these incomes are converted using the price of rice in the Yangon market (56 
Kyats/kg) prevailing during the study period, they are equivalent to 3,300 kg of rice per household 
and 640 kg per person per year. 
The composition of income, shown in Table 4, differs across villages. The level of self-
employment income from agriculture was highest in villages DRY1 and DRY2 and lowest in DRY3. 
The share of agricultural self-employment income in total household income was highest in villages 
HILL2 and DRY1 and lowest in COAST. The table shows that villages with higher agricultural 
self-employment incomes and higher non-agricultural incomes had higher per capita incomes 
overall. A probit analysis of the determinants of having household members working in non­
agricultural jobs shows that education and local demand derived from farm income are important 
factors (Kurosaki et al., 2004). Therefore, the disparity in agricultural self-employment income is 
the key to explaining the disparity in household income. 
Since crop income accounted for about 99% of agricultural self-employment income and 
farm size is pre-determined in the short run, the focus below is on the determinants of crop income 
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 per acre. The cropping patterns of the sample farmers are shown in Table 5. Of the major crop 
groups, paddy occupied more than 60% in DELTA1, DELTA2, and DRY1. Among these villages, 
DELTA1 had the least diversified cropping pattern: monsoon paddy followed by summer paddy. In 
contrast, in DELTA2 and DRY1, not all of the paddy fields were cropped with summer paddy but 
some fields were cropped with pulses (DELTA2) and vegetables (DRY1). The other five villages 
had a more diversified agriculture. Among these five villages, DRY3 and COAST had higher paddy 
shares than the other three. There were no paddy fields in DRY2. 
Table 6 relates these cropping patterns with per-acre crop income. Crop income per 
household was highest in DRY2 and lowest in DRY3 and DELTA1. Normalized by farm size, crop 
income per farm area was highest in DRY1 and HILL2, followed by DRY2, and lowest in DRY3, 
DELTA2, and DELTA1. A comparison of the first two columns in Table 6 suggests that farm income 
per acre was lower in villages where paddy cropping was more dominant than in other villages 
because per-acre income was lowest for paddy and highest for vegetables. 
This negative relation between the paddy share and per-acre crop income was observed 
within villages as well. Table 6 also shows the intra-village correlation coefficients between the crop 
income per acre of a farm and cropping patterns (the acreage share of each crop group in the gross 
cropped area). In all villages, the correlation coefficient between the per-acre crop income and the 
paddy share was negative. It was statistically significant in DELTA2, DRY1, DRY3, HILL2, and 
COAST. There was no meaningful variation in DELTA1, since most farmers grew monsoon paddy 
and summer paddy only, while no paddy was grown in DRY2. In DELTA2, the correlation 
coefficient between the per-acre crop income and the pulses share was 0.448. In DRY1, the 
correlation coefficient between the per-acre crop income and the vegetables share was 0.555. 
Therefore, in DELTA2 and DRY1, villages located in the major paddy growing regions, farmers 
who did not grow much paddy on paddy fields during the summer season but grew more commercial 
crops instead were better off. This indicates that the policy of maximizing paddy output places a 
heavy burden on farmers in the major paddy-growing regions. In the other five villages, where 
agriculture was more diversified, each village had non-paddy crops whose acreage share was 
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 positively correlated with the per-acre crop income. In these villages, it is not always the case that 
these non-paddy crops directly compete with paddy for land, because these crops are usually grown 
on farmland not designated as paddy fields. Even then, the allocation of labor and efforts expended 
on non-paddy crops should be adversely affected when the paddy acreage is increased. 
Thus it seems that farmers grew too much paddy in the sense that its cultivation replaced 
more lucrative crops, resulting in lower crop income than the highest level achievable from the same 
farmland. Kurosaki et al. (2004) suggested that land and procurement policies were responsible for 
this situation. A supplemental finding of their study was that there was a regional difference in the 
enforcement of the government's crop plan: strict enforcement along procedures inherited from the 
socialist period was attempted in the three villages located in the core regions of paddy-based 
agriculture (DELTA1, DELTA2, DRY1), with the strictest enforcement in DELTA1; strict 
enforcement was being extended to the other two villages in the dry zone (DRY2, DRY3) at the time 
of the survey, while the other three villages (HILL1, HILL2, COAST) were subject to the weakest 
enforcement of crop plans. This paper formalizes this idea and tests it statistically, focusing on 
intra-village differences among farmers within villages. 
3. Analytical Framework 
3.1 A Theoretical Model of Farmers' Crop Choice 
To explain the situation described above, a simple model of a farmer's crop choice is 
presented first. Since paddy is the backbone of Myanmar's economy, it is treated as the numeraire. 
The farmer has a fixed acreage x0 of farmland that can be allocated to either a paddy or a non-paddy 
crop. Let x denote the paddy acreage. The allocation x results in farm income net of production costs, 
which is denoted by a function f(x). This function reflects the farming technology available to the 
farmer and the resource constraints he faces. The function is assumed to be continuous, 
differentiable, and single-peaked. Thus, in the absence of procurement and land policies, a profit-
maximizing farmer chooses x 
* that maximizes f(x). 
Under the policies prevailing in Myanmar during the survey period, however, the farmer 
9 was required to deliver to the government a fixed quantity of paddy proportional to z (the planned 
acreage under paddy, which is assumed to be larger than x 
*). The total procurement quota is thus bqz, 
where b is the procurement ratio and q is the average yield of paddy per acre. As explained in 
Section 2, the government procurement price of paddy was below its market price, resulting in 
implicit taxation on paddy farmers. The implicit tax amount is denoted by tqz, where t is the taxation 
rate that is equal to b times the price disparity. The government fixes z, b, and t. 
Although the farmer is expected to allocate z acres of his farmland to paddy, this may not 
be enforceable, i.e., x may deviate from z. However, when the deviation is large and detected by the 
local administration, the administration may threaten the farmer with revoking the farmland. The 
expected welfare cost of this threat is assumed to be a quadratic function, A(z-x)
2, where A is a 
non-negative parameter characterizing the political relation of the farmer with the local 
administration. Given these assumptions, the payoff of the farmer is expressed as 
2 y = f(x) - tqz - A(z-x) .  (1) 
The first order necessary condition for the optimal solution is given by 
f'(x) = - 2A(z-x).  (2) 
Let x 
** be the optimal solution for the farmer that satisfies equation (2). When it is an interior 
solution, by assumption, the following relations hold 
*  **  x  ≤ x  < z,  (3) 
** ∂x  /∂A > 0.  (4) 
The last inequality shows the basic relation for the empirical analysis below. 
When A=0 (the case where the local administration has no ability to force farmers to 
** follow its directions regarding the planned acreage), x 
* = x   holds. In this case, the procurement 
** system does not affect farmers' production decisions at all. When A>0, however, x 
* < x  holds, so 
that the procurement quota becomes a distortionary implicit tax. As A approaches infinity, x 
** also 
approaches z. The last case may characterize the situation in Myanmar before the marketing reforms 
that began in the late 1980s. 
Thus the divergence between the actual acreage and the income-maximizing acreage is an 
10 increasing function of parameter A. It is expected that A is higher for a farmer who has some political 
reason to please the local administration. Although it is possible that the parameter may be higher for 
a farmer who derives greater moral satisfaction from following the rule, this possibility is not 
analyzed since such preferences are not directly observable. Instead, it is assumed that preferences 
do not systematically differ across individuals within villages. Although parameter A is higher for a 
farmer who lives in a village under tighter control of the central authorities, this aspect is not 
analyzed directly but controlled indirectly by village fixed effects in the empirical analysis (see 
below). Although parameter A should be treated as endogenous in the long run, since it is 
determined as a result of strategic interactions of individual farmers with the local administration, it 
is treated as exogenous in the empirical analysis, because the focus of the analysis is on the short-run 
determinants of crop choice. 
3.2 Empirical Specification
The share of paddy acreage in total farmland under cultivation, x/x0, is the natural choice 
for the dependent variable for regression analysis. In the empirical analysis, paddy acreage divided 
by the acreage of gross cultivated areas is adopted as the dependent variable. To check the 
robustness of the results, another dependent variable, using the acreage of net cultivated areas as its 
denominator, is also tried. 
As explanatory variables, household/individual characteristics and village dummies are 
included. Since villages differ with respect to their market conditions, the strictness of enforcement 
of government crop planning, technologies, and other factors, it is impossible to identify the effects 
of these factors separately using the dataset adopted in this study. The number of sample villages is 
too small for such an analysis. Therefore, village fixed effects are included to control for these 
factors collectively and to enable us to concentrate on the intra-village variations in cropping 
patterns. 
The main prediction of the theoretical model to be tested empirically is the effect of A, the 
political relations between a farmer and the local administration. The focus of the model on the 
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 degree of control exercised by the local administration as a determinant of the amount of paddy a 
farmer grows makes it possible to examine an important aspect of crop choice that other models fail 
to address. For example, models emphasizing credit constraints (Feder et al., 1990), risk 
management (Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002), domestic food security (Kurosaki, 2004), and 
resource constraints (Gotsch et al., 1975) do not address the response of farmers' crop choice to 
political relations. These models instead predict that human capital and household resource 
availability affect farmers' crop choice. 
However, it is possible that, in a rural setting like Myanmar, farmers with a higher A are 
those with superior access to technology, resources, or markets. Therefore, even if it is found that a 
proxy variable for A is associated with a higher paddy share, this association could be the result of 
these indirect effects and not of the political mechanism modeled above. Furthermore, there are 
other endogenous variables that are chosen simultaneously with x/x0, which were assumed away in 
the theoretical model for simplicity. As shown in Section 2, household income is composed of 
agricultural self-employment income, agricultural wage income, and non-agricultural income. The 
empirical specification should take into consideration that households simultaneously choose 
several variables (including x/x0) to determine the level of each income source. Therefore, the 
following four strategies are adopted in this paper to identify the effect of parameter A. 
First, a completely reduced-form approach is adopted. Although it is of interest to quantify 
the effects on crop choice of the level of non-agricultural self-employment income or agricultural 
wage income, valid instrumental variables were not found in the dataset to identify these effects. A 
more structural estimation is left for future study. 
Second, to control for other factors that affect crop choice, human capital and household 
resource availability are included as explanatory variables. Human capital and household resource 
availability, such as education, household demography, land size, and other assets, may be important 
determinants of crop choice because they influence farmers' access to markets, technology, credit, 
and subsistence food. Although these variables may include information on farmers’ political 
relations, this aspect is ignored to set a higher hurdle for the theoretical model to pass the empirical 
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 test. 
Third, an attempt is made to search for variables to represent A that are not directly related 
to households' access to markets and technologies. Candidates are variables representing 
expectations regarding future land inheritance from parents and the early adoption of new 
agricultural technology during the pre-transition period. During the pre-transition period, the local 
administration designated several villagers as "contact farmers" and implemented policies through 
them. Sample farmers satisfying one of the above two characteristics are likely to belong to the 
families that were designated as contact farmers. In addition, as explained in Section 2, the land 
tillage right is not officially inheritable, but children are usually given the right to cultivate their 
parents' land if the local administrator finds no reason to deny such a transaction. This implies that a 
farmer who has parents with farmland and expects them to transfer the tillage right to him/her in the 
near future may have an additional incentive to follow the directions of the local administration 
today so that the administration will not object to the transfer of the cultivation right. The early 
adoption of new technology during the planned economy period is a more direct indicator for the 
status of a contact farmer because such adoption of new technology was not chosen by the farmer 
but ordered by the administration. 
However, it is still possible to argue that both of these variables capture not only political 
relations but also reflect unobservable characteristics of the farmer that enhance the efficiency of 
paddy production. A farmers' expectation to inherit the parents' paddy field
4 or having been directed 
in the past to try out a new technology may be linked to her/his unobservable ability to produce 
paddy more efficiently. If this is the case, these variables should not only be associated with a larger 
paddy acreage share but also greater paddy productivity, even after controlling for other observable 
characteristics that affect productivity. The fourth strategy of this paper is, therefore, to regress 
variables representing paddy productivity on the same set of variables adopted for the paddy acreage 
share. If it is found that the two variables proxying for A are associated with a higher paddy acreage 
share but with no increase in paddy productivity, the argument in favor of the unobservable 
productivity superiority is not supported. Instead, such a puzzling situation could be explained in a 
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 consistent way by the theoretical model described above. As a second set of dependent variables, 
paddy output per acre and paddy value-added per acre are adopted. 
4 Estimation Results 
4.1 Determinants of Farmers' Crop Choice 
In order to examine the effect of individual and household characteristics on crop choice, 
the following variables were tried initially: (1) proxies for political relations (the size of parents' 
landholding, a dummy representing the expectation of inheriting land, and an indicator variable for 
the early adoption of a new technology in the period before 1990
5); (2) farmland size (the size of 
lowland fields managed by the household, the size of upland fields managed by the household, the 
irrigation status of the land); (3) demographic variables (the size and composition of household 
members, the sex and age of the household head); (4) education (schooling years of the household 
head, a dummy representing whether or not the head was educated in a monastery school, the 
highest education status in schooling years among adult household members); (5) household food 
security concerns (share of rice consumption in household income, a dummy variable for having had 
to borrow rice from neighbors for household consumption); and (6) assets (total value of household 
assets, value of major asset groups, number of major agricultural machines). Several of these 
variables were found to be robustly insignificant and most of the insignificant variables were 
excluded from the results reported in this paper. However, at least one variable from each group was 
retained. See Table 7 for the definition and summary statistics of the retained empirical variables. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 8. They show that the dummy variable for the 
expectation of inheriting land (Future_inh) and the indicator variable for the early adoption of new 
technology in the past (Past_techn) are both positive predictors of the paddy acreage share. The 
effect of the inheritance dummy is positive with statistical significance at the 5 to 10% level on both 
paddy acreage per gross cultivated land and paddy acreage per net cultivated land. The effect of the 
early technology adoption variable is statistically significant on paddy acreage per net cultivated 
land while it is not significant in some specifications for paddy acreage per gross cultivated land. 
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 Table 8 also shows that larger upland fields are associated with a smaller paddy acreage 
share, and a larger share of rice consumption in household income is associated with a larger paddy 
acreage share. The positive effect of the rice consumption share indicates that domestic food 
concern is an important determinant of crop choice in the study region, which corroborates a similar 
finding regarding the choice of wage contracts in the same region (Kurosaki, 2004). 
These results remained qualitatively unchanged when other variables from each group of 
explanatory variables were employed. Since the left-hand-side variable is truncated between zero 
and one (Paddy_gca) or between zero and two (Paddy_nca), non-linear models such as tobit, probit, 
and logit were also tried. The pattern that Future_inh, Past_techn, and Rice_cons are positive 
predictors of the paddy acreage share did not change qualitatively.
6 
To investigate whether or not the positive correlation between the paddy acreage share and 
the two variables proxying for A is due to unobservable superiority in paddy production, paddy 
output per acre and paddy value-added per acre are regressed on the same variables employed to 
explain the paddy acreage share. The results in Table 9 show that the inheritance expectation 
variable has a negative coefficient while the technology adoption variable has a positive coefficient, 
although both coefficients are statistically insignificant. In other specifications not reported in this 
paper using different sets of explanatory variables, the two variables are also robustly insignificant. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that farmers who expect to inherit land or possess past experience of 
adopting new technology grow more paddy crops although their paddy productivity is not higher 
than that of other farmers. If crop choice were solely determined by the relative profitability of 
competing crops, this would be a puzzling result. But if we borrow the insights from the theoretical 
model described in Section 3, the paradox can be resolved: farmers that are more susceptible to 
pressure from the local administration to follow the crop plan grow more paddy crops even though 
paddy crops are less profitable than other crops. 
Table 9 shows that the education level of the household head also has a statistically 
significant, positive effect on paddy productivity. This result supports the view that education 
enhances farm productivity, a fact that has been demonstrated empirically for other developing 
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 countries (see, for example, Jamison and Lau, 1982; Kurosaki and Khan, forthcoming). If farmers 
were completely free to choose their acreage shares, and the effect of education on the productivity 
of non-paddy crops was not strong enough, more educated farmers would devote a higher share of 
their farmland to paddy crops because of their superiority in paddy production. As shown in Table 8, 
this is not the case, suggesting that the positive effect of education on the paddy acreage through the 
paddy productivity enhancing mechanism is possibly cancelled out, either because more educated 
farmers with higher non-agricultural income have more bargaining power vis-à-vis the local 
administration so that they are able to reduce paddy crops, or because they are more efficient in 
non-paddy crop than paddy crop production so that their comparative advantage favors non-paddy 
crops.
7 Paddy productivity is lower for households whose share of rice in the family budget is higher. 
This seems to suggest that these households are more concerned with household food security so 
that they grow paddy to the limit on their very marginal land, resulting in lower paddy productivity. 
4.2 The Welfare Impact of Paddy Policies 
The regression results above have shown that political relations affect the paddy acreage 
share and the correlation analysis in Section 2 has shown that the paddy acreage share is negatively 
correlated with per-acre crop income. These findings raise the question how large the negative 
welfare impact of the paddy output maximization policies, functioning through parameter A, is. 
To simulate the impact, household income is regressed on the paddy acreage share 
(Paddy_gca) and other variables representing human capital and household resource availability 
(Table 10). The dummy variable representing the expectation of inheriting land (Future_inh) and the 
indicator variable for the early adoption of new technology in the past (Past_techn) are deleted from 
the regression to serve as identifying instrumental variables (IVs) for the endogenous variable 
Paddy_gca. 
8 
The IV estimation results show that both crop and household income increase with the size 
of farmland and the level of education. The impact of education on total household income is twice 
as large as that on crop income. This is consistent with the probit estimation result for the same 
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 households estimated by Kurosaki et al. (2004) showing that more educated individuals are more 
likely to be engaged in lucrative non-farm jobs. The positive contribution of education to income, 
mainly through opening up employment opportunities in the non-agricultural sector, is a well-
known fact that has been observed in other developing and transitional economies (Kurosaki and 
Khan, forthcoming). This paper shows that the relation holds in rural Myanmar as well. 
The parameter of concern is the effect of the paddy acreage share (Paddy_gca) on income. 
The effect is significantly negative both on crop income and household income. An interesting 
finding is that the effect of Paddy_gca is three times as large on total household income as it is on 
crop income. This indicates that increasing the paddy acreage share reduces household income not 
only through the reduction of crop income due to a greater deviation from the crop income 
maximization point, but also through the reduction of income from other sources due to a decreased 
allocation of household effort and resources to these sources. To examine the endogeneity bias, the 
same model was estimated by OLS. The OLS estimates were about one sixth to one fifth of the IV 
estimates. Thus the OLS estimation underestimated the loss of rural incomes resulting from the 
policy. 
Based on the IV coefficients in Table 10, the loss of household income through parameter 
A could be calculated as follows. When A is decreased due to a change in the household status with 
regard to the expectation of inheriting land (Future_inh is changed from one to zero), the paddy 
acreage share in gross cultivated areas decreases by 6.9 percentage points (see Table 8), resulting in 
an increase in crop income of 14,300 Kyats and an increase in household income of 41,800 Kyats. 
These values are 10.4% of the average crop income per household and 21.5% of the average 
household income respectively. When A is decreased due to a change in the household status with 
regard to early technology adoption (Past_techn is changed from 1 to -1), the paddy acreage share 
decreases by 3.7 percentage points (twice the coefficient reported in Table 8), resulting in an 
increase in crop income of 7,500 Kyats (5.0% of the average crop income) and an increase in 
household income of 22,000 Kyats (11.3% of the average household income). Thus the welfare loss 




Based on a sample household survey conducted in 2001 and covering diverse agro-
ecological environments in rural Myanmar, this paper showed that the transition of Myanmar's 
agricultural sector did not lead to a rapid increase in productivity and rural incomes. Important 
reasons are that government policies put too much production emphasis on paddy crops with an 
income per acre that was lower than that of other crops and that the government had the wherewithal 
to enforce these policies, compelling farmers to plant paddy rather than other crops. Since the 
enforcement of government crop planning varied not only across villages but also within villages, a 
theoretical model focusing on the political relations between a farmer and the local administration 
was developed to derive implications for the empirical analysis of intra-village variations in 
cropping patterns. The theoretical model predicted that the acreage share of non-lucrative paddy 
should be higher for farmers who are under tighter control of the local authorities. It was found that 
the paddy acreage share was indeed higher for such farmers, approximated by their expectation of 
future land inheritance from their parents and by their previous experience in adopting new 
technology during the period of socialist planning. Since the inheritance expectation and the 
technology adoption variables were not found to increase paddy productivity, the argument that 
these variables reflect unobservable productivity superiority in paddy production was not supported. 
Therefore, the estimation results were consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model. 
What do the findings of this paper say about Myanmar's agricultural performance 
compared to other transitional economies? First of all, the findings question the validity of the 
classification by Rozelle and Swinnen (2004: Tables 1 and 2) of Myanmar as an example of high 
performing East Asia. Unlike in Vietnam and China, output gains in Myanmar were not 
accompanied by gains in agricultural productivity and rural incomes. Second, the findings 
nevertheless support the main argument by Rozelle and Swinnen, namely that both productivity and 
output increased in countries where market forces led to a rapid rise in agricultural produce prices 
after the transition, while in countries where prices fell after the transition only productivity 
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 increased, with output stagnating or declining. Like in the East Asian high performers Vietnam and 
China, agricultural produce prices in Myanmar were kept artificially low during the era of socialist 
planning. But unlike in Vietnam and China, prices did not rise substantially after the planning was 
abandoned, because of the distortions in agricultural marketing policies. Despite the fall in paddy 
prices in the later stage of the transition, the distortions in land use policies prevented farmers from 
adjusting their cropping patterns freely. In a word, the stagnation in income and productivity after 
the transition in Myanmar's agriculture can be attributed to the distortions in the transition process. 
The policy implications of the empirical analysis are simple. At the time the survey was 
conducted, there remained vast room for an expansion of agricultural output and rural incomes in 
Myanmar, even without any innovation in technology or further investment in irrigation. All that 
was needed to tap this potential was to give farmers more freedom in land use and liberalize 
paddy/rice marketing. Simulation results based on the regression estimates showed that the loss in 
rural incomes due to farmers' being forced to grow too much paddy was not negligible. The second 
phase of marketing liberalization that began in 2003/04
10 does seem to be a step in the direction of 
further liberation of marketing and land use policies. A follow-up survey under this new regime is a 
task that remains for further investigations. 
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 Notes 
1 This section is based on Kurosaki et al. (2004). 
2 The second phase of marketing liberalization began in fiscal year 2003/04, in which the 
abandonment of paddy procurement and the opening up of rice export to private traders were 
announced (Okamoto, 2005). However, at present, information on the actual implementation of 
these reforms is unavailable and their future is very uncertain. For these reasons, this paper analyzes 
the situation before the second phase only. Note that the primary dataset for this paper was collected 
in 2001. 
3 The smallest administrative unit in Myanmar is the "village tract," which usually consists of 
several hamlets or natural villages. While Table 2 refers to "village tracts," in the text and the 
following tables, they are simply referred to as "villages" for convenience's sake. 
4 Younger household heads are more likely to expect to inherit land from their parents. To control for 
the human capital effect of accumulated farming experience, the age of the household head is 
included and retained in the regression even when it is not significant. 
5 The indicator takes 1 if the technology was adopted before the median year of adoption in each 
village. See also the definition in Table 7. 
6 Results under alternative specifications are available on request. 
7 A model similar to the one reported in Table 9 was estimated with non-paddy output per acre as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient on education was positive and slightly larger than that for paddy 
but it was not statistically significant, even at the 20% level. Therefore, the test for whether the 
efficiency enhancing effect is stronger in the case of non-paddy than paddy crops was inconclusive. 
8 The variables Future_inh and Past_techn are valid identifying IVs for the endogenous variable 
Paddy_gca in the crop income (Y_crop) regression, as shown in Tables 8 and 9. On the other hand, if 
the two variables directly affect choices made by the farmer with respect to non-crop agricultural 
self-employment income, agricultural wage income, or non-agricultural income, they cannot serve 
as identifying IVs for total household income (Y_hh). As a reduced-form approach, non-crop 
agricultural self-employment income, agricultural wage income, and non-agricultural income were 
22
 each regressed on the variables listed  in Table 8. Since the two variables Future_inh and Past_techn 
were not statistically significant even at the 20% level in all of the three regressions, it was 
concluded that the two can serve as identifying IVs for Paddy_gca in the Y_hh regression as well. 
9 It should be noted, however, that these figures ignore market equilibrium effects. A decrease in 
paddy acreage should increase the market price of paddy while an increase in the production of 
non-paddy crops may decrease their market prices. Incorporating equilibrium effects is left for 
further analysis. 
10 See endnote 2. 
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 Table 1: Myanmar's Economy and Agriculture 
1985/86  1990/91  1996/97  1998/99  2000/01 
Growth rate of real GDP  2.9  2.8  6.4  5.8  13.6 
Growth rate of agricultural sector  2.2  2.0  3.8  3.5  9.5 
Agricultural sector's share in GDP  39.7  38.7  36.2  34.5  33.1 
Agricultural sector's share in exports  42.4  31.8  36.1  28.0  18.9 
Agricultural sector's share in workforce  63.4 
Total irrigated area (million ha)  3.0  2.9  4.6  5.1  6.0 
Share of irrigated area under paddy (%)  70.1  74.8  82.3  76.6  76.5 
Note: "Agricultural sector" in this table does not include livestock, fishery, and forestry. 




Township  Village tract  Topology  Irrigation  Major crops 
DELTA1  Ayeyarwady yaungmya  Kyonethout  Deltaic agric.  Pump  Paddy 
DELTA2  Bago D.  Waw  Acarick  Deltaic agric.  Rainfed, Canal  Paddy, pulses 
DRY1  Mandalay D.  Kyaukse  Pyiban  Dry zone  Canal  Paddy, vegetables 
DRY2  Magway D.  Magway  Kanpyar  Dry zone  Rainfed  Upland crops 
DRY3  Magway D.  Taungdwingy y  Dry zone  Rainfed, Tank  Upland crops, paddy 
HILL1  Shan S.  Nyaungshwe  Linkin  Hilly region  Rainfed  Vegetables, paddy, 
sugarcane 
HILL2  Shan S.  Kalaw  Myinmahti  Hilly region  Rainfed  Vegetables, paddy 
COAST  Tanintharyi D.  Myeik  Engamaw  Coastal agric.  Rainfed  Paddy, rubber 
Source: Authors' survey (ibid. for the tables below). 
 D. M
i WetkathaTable 3: Sample Households 
Total number of households  Number of sample households 
Farm  Non-Farm  Total  Farm  Non-Farm  Total 
DELTA1  232  283  515  67  33  100 
DELTA2  213  243  456  60  40  100 
DRY1  118  101  219  65  37  102 
DRY2  326  336  662  24  16  40 
DRY3  334  176  510  24  16  40 
HILL1  544  298  842  26  12  38 
HILL2  422  75  497  34  6  40 
COAST  647  520  1167  41  20  61 
Total  2836  2032  4868  341  180  521 Table 4: Average Asset and Income of Sample Households 



























excluding unearned income transfers 
(%) 
DELTA1  5.97  218.2  134,535  30,065  61.5  14.8  23.6 
DELTA2  7.17  207.8  155,423  29,745  57.3  24.7  18.0 
DRY1  3.32  232.7  209,661  49,378  61.3  11.9  26.8 
DRY2  6.13  282.0  216,482  43,975  69.0  10.4  20.6 
DRY3  6.06  188.5  87,591  17,084  60.5  29.3  10.2 
HILL1  7.06  225.7  194,807  36,447  53.9  22.7  23.4 
HILL2  3.92  172.9  169,477  32,147  70.2  11.7  18.1 
COAST  5.81  579.0  314,478  44,547  33.8  9.7  56.4 
Total  5.62  261.0  184,086  36,177  55.9  15.3  28.8 
Notes: 
* The sum of the values of livestock, agricultural equipment and machinery, and transportation equipment.
Household income is defined as the sum of wage/salary receipts including the imputed value of in-kind 
payment such as meals and rice, non-agricultural self-employment earnings (gross revenue minus actually paid 
costs), agricultural self-employment earnings (sum of the value of output minus actually paid costs), and net 
receipts of non-earned income. Median market prices within each village were used to impute the value of non 
cash transactions such as the paddy produced by farmers and consumed by themselves and in-kind payment to 
workers. See Kurosaki et al. (2004) for details on the estimation of income. Table 5: Cropping Patterns of Sample Households 
Acreage share of major crop groups in the gross cultivated area (%)
Number  Average 
Average 
of house- farm size 
gross 
Oilseed  Industrial  Other holds#  (acres) 
area (acres)  total 
cultivated  Paddy,  Summer 
Pulses  Vegetables 
crops* paddy  crops  crops 
DELTA1  67  8.97  15.08  99.5  42.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2 
DELTA2  60  12.10  17.14  74.0  8.6  25.5  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1 
DRY1  71  5.38  8.75  62.5  22.5  1.8  16.2  17.4  0.8  1.3 
DRY2  24  10.45  21.42  0.0  0.0  35.6  46.7  0.2  0.0  17.4 
DRY3  26  9.51  12.27  45.6  1.1  15.9  30.9  2.6  0.2  4.7 
HILL1  26  10.44  9.18  15.4  11.4  9.7  12.2  6.4  22.3  34.1 
HILL2  32  4.53  5.24  32.1  0.0  6.9  9.4  50.6  0.0  1.0 
COAST  44  8.21  7.77  51.7  1.0  0.3  0.0  2.4  33.6  12.0 
Notes 
# Only those households with positive crop acreage during the survey year are included in this table. 
* Industrial crops include sugarcane, cotton, and natural rubber. Table 6: Correlation between Crop Acreage Shares and Per-Acre Crop Income 
Village- Village- Intra-village correlation coefficients between crop acreage 
average of crop  average of  shares and per-acre crop income 
income per  paddy shares in 
acre of  the gross  Paddy acreage  Acreage shares  (Name of crop
farmland  cultivated areas 
(Kyats/acre)  (%) 
shares  of crop group i  group i) 
DELTA1  11,222  99.5  -0.019  0.162  (Vegetables) 
DELTA2  12,958  74.0  0.448 *  (Pulses) 
DRY1  33,305  62.5  0.555 *  (Vegetables) 
DRY2  25,718  0.0  n.a.  0.599 *  (Other crops) 
DRY3  9,582  45.6  0.349 *  (Oilseed crops) 
HILL1  13,200  15.4  -0.094  0.319 *  (Industrial crops) 
HILL2  33,313  32.1  0.308 *  (Vegetables) 
COAST  14,256  51.7  0.810 *  (Vegetables) 






-0.473 * Table 7: Variables Used in the Regression Analyses 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
1. Dependent variables 
Crop choice model 
Paddy_gca  Acreage of paddy crop divided by the total acreage of  0.648  0.341  0  1 
gross cultivated area of the farm. 
Paddy_nca  Acreage of paddy crop divided by farm size (acreage;  0.954  0.608  0  2 
defined as the total acreage of net cultivated area). 
Paddy productivity model 
VQ_paddy  Output value of paddy divided by the acreage under paddy  0.233  0.123  0.000  0.805 
crop (100,000 Kyats/acre). 
VA_paddy  Value-added of paddy divided by the acreage under paddy  0.135  0.140  -0.434  0.705 
crop (100,000 Kyats/acre). 
Household income model 
Y_crop  Household income from self-employment in agriculture  1.375  1.328  -0.640  10.757 
(crop income only) (100,000 Kyats). 
Y_hh  Total household income (100,000 Kyats).  1.941  2.745  -1.275  42.481 
2. Explanatory variables 
Household and individual characteristics 
Lowland  Acreage of lowland fields managed by the household  6.262  6.029  0  44 
Upland  Acreage of other types of fields (mainly upland fields)  2.124  4.230  0  34.11 
managed by the household (acres). 
Future_inh  Dummy variable for the expectation of the household to  0.163 
inherit cultivation rights from parents' households. 
Past_techn  Indicator variable for the past adoption of new technology*  Past_techn=-1: 143 observations, 
before the median year of adoption in each village (=1 if  Past_techn= 0: 98 observations, 
adopted earlier than the median, =-1 if adopted later than or  Past_techn= 1: 85 observations 
equal to the median, =0 if the household began farming 
after the median). 
Educ_head  Education status of the household head in terms of  3.095  3.074  0  16 
completed years of schooling (years). 
Age_head  Age of the household head (years).  47.414  13.067  21  93 
Rice_cons  Importance of rice in the family budget, defined as "the  0.282  0.278  0.005  1.000 
value of the annual amount of rice consumed at home" 
divided by "the annual household income". When the value 
was larger than unity, it was truncated at one. 
Thresher  Dummy for owning a threshing machine for paddy.  0.021 
Village fixed effects 
DELTA1  Dummy variable for DELTA1.#  0.206 
DELTA2  Dummy variable for DELTA2.  0.184 
DRY1  Dummy variable for DRY1.  0.218 
DRY3  Dummy variable for DRY3.  0.080 
HILL1  Dummy variable for HILL1.  0.080 
HILL2  Dummy variable for HILL2.  0.098 
COAST  Dummy variable for COAST.  0.135 
Notes: (1) The unit of observation are farm households with positive areas under cultivation in the survey year and 
living in villages other than DRY2. The number of observations thus is 326. The number of observations is 291 for 
VQ_paddy and VA_paddy because these variables are not defined for 35 households that did not grow paddy crop at 
all. 
# This dummy variable is used as reference in regression analyses. 
using perennial canals, DRY1=summer paddy production using Manawthakha variety, DRY3=IR variety for monsoon 
paddy production, HILL1=Shwewar-tun (Ywe) variety for monsoon paddy production, HILL2=Kauk Phwar Phy 
variety for monsoon paddy production, COAST=summer paddy production using artificial irrigation. 
(2) When the variable is a dummy, the percentage of those observations taking one is reported. 
* The key technology is: DELTA1=summer paddy production using diesel pumps, DELTA2=summer paddy production Table 8: Determinants of Crop Choices 
Dep. variable=  Paddy_gca  Paddy_nca 
Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err 




















0.0183  (0.017) 
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F-stat for zero slopes 
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64.27 ***  72.08 *** 
Note:
 
Estimated by OLS with Huber-White heteroscedastic robust standard errors in
 
parentheses. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*).
 Table 9: Determinants of Paddy Productivity 
Dep. variable=  VQ_paddy  VA_paddy 
Coeff.  Std. Err  Coeff.  Std. Err 
Individual and household attributes 
Lowland  (0.001)  -0.0012  (0.001) 
Upland  -0.0006  (0.003)  -0.0018  (0.004) 
Future_inh  -0.0003  (0.014)  -0.0090  (0.022) 
Past_techn  0.0043  (0.002)  0.0016  (0.002) 
Educ_head  (0.000)  0.0005  (0.001) 
Age_head  0.0023  (0.008)  0.0027  (0.010) 
Rice_cons  (0.018)  (0.021) 
Thresher  0.0004  (0.025)  -0.0160  (0.030) 
Village fixed effects 
DELTA2  (0.010)  (0.011) 
DRY1  (0.016)  (0.020) 
DRY3  (0.020)  (0.022) 
HILL1  (0.048)  (0.054) 
HILL2  (0.024)  (0.035) 
COAST  0.0145  (0.018)  (0.020) 
Intercept  (0.026)  (0.029) 
F-stat for zero slopes 
R
2  0.559  0.510 
-0.0014 * 
0.0001 ** 
-0.0712 ***  -0.0743 *** 
-0.0609 ***  0.0330 *** 
0.0881 ***  0.0699 *** 
-0.1555 ***  -0.0545 ** 
0.1726 ***  0.1592 *** 
-0.1135 ***  -0.2548 *** 
0.0874 *** 
0.2549 ***  0.1242 *** 
25.29 ***  17.47 *** 
Note: see Table 8. Table 10: Impacts of Paddy Policies on Household Income 
Dep. variable=  Y_crop  Y_hh 
Coeff.  Std. Err  .  Coeff  Std. Err 
Individual and household attributes 
Paddy_gca (endogenous)  (1.223)  (3.239) 
Lowland  (0.020)  (0.034) 
Upland  (0.028)  (0.071) 
Educ_head  (0.039)  (0.052) 
Age_head  (0.005)  0.0133  (0.013) 
Rice_cons  (0.266)  (0.741) 
Thresher  0.2779  (0.337)  (1.061) 
Village fixed effects 
DELTA2  -0.3635  (0.314)  -1.3724  (0.895) 
DRY1  -0.1142  (0.406)  -1.6347  (1.045) 
DRY3  (0.563)  (1.452) 
HILL1  (0.909)  (2.129) 
HILL2  -0.9057  (0.756)  (1.945) 
COAST  (0.361)  -1.5997  (1.038) 
Intercept  (1.117)  (2.701) 
F-stat for zero slopes 
R
2  0.385  0.146 
-2.0604 *  -6.0303 * 
0.0793 ***  0.0633 * 
0.0701 **  0.1522 ** 
0.0824 **  0.1792 *** 
0.0122 ** 
-1.6232 ***  -1.4464 ** 
1.7899 * 
-1.2900 **  -3.8970 ** 
-1.5014 *  -5.1521 ** 
-4.3283 ** 
-1.0468 *** 
2.2273 **  6.1751 ** 
15.80 ***  9.71 *** 
Notes: 
(1) Estimated by the instrumental variables method. See Table 8 for the first stage
regression result for Paddy_gca. 
(2) Huber-White heteroscedastic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 